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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the role of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) as an institutional actor which has been instrumental 
in the German debate concerning European integration and the doctrine of 
sovereignty in the light of one case in particular, namely, the so-called Banana 
Case. The analytical framework within which the role and the position of the 
state in the process of European Integration is customarily interpreted by the 
main protagonists of the German academic debate will be assessed. References 
to the previous cases concerning European Integration decided by the FCC shall 
be made for the purposes of the discussion only. In particular, it will be 
examined to what extent, if at all, there is a corollary between the concept of a 
unitary, homogenous state and a juridical debate concerning European 
integration which its proponents seek to ensure is also unitary and homogenous 
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Law is a normative order which is customarily understood in terms of a 
hierarchy.
1 In the German case, for example, the prevailing hierarchy is 
constituted by the Basic Law, Federal Law and State Law. European 
Community (EC) law may also be understood according to a hierarchical model 
to the extent that, as the catechism provides, it prevails over national law
2 and 
consists of primary and secondary sources of law arranged according to a 
hierarchy of precedence or Anwendungsvorrang. The implications for state 
sovereignty are considerable, particularly given the increasing growth of 
substantive EC law subject matters which have traditionally resided within the 
exclusive competence of the member states but the responsibility for which has 
been pooled though Europeanisation. Immigration law (Monar 1998) 
(Hailbronner & Theiry 1998) and policies (Joppke 1998) is a case in point; the 
single currency yet another (Beaumont &Walker 1999). In effect, member states 
no longer have absolute sovereignty over such issues in the sense envisaged by 
the Treaty of Westphalia,
3 a matter with which the constitutional courts of the 
respective member states are in the process of coming to terms with.
4 Indeed, the 
constitutional courts belong to the influential actors in the integration process 
and have, in their own way, contributed to the politicisation of the sovereignty 
debate and have helped to perpetuate the view of the age of absolute sovereignty 
as, to draw from Milton, ‘paradise lost’.
5  
 
The issue of loss informs much of the debate concerning the project of 
European integration and sovereignty, which at the micro-level represents an 
illustration of the effects of the macro-level of globalization (Sassen 1996). As 
regards sovereignty and the EU, loss has also been instrumentalised by some 
who seek to initiate what in law is sometimes referred to as a ‘claw back’ 
process or, to draw from Milton yet again, to regain that which has been ‘lost’.
6 
Others, however, take a more pragmatic view, adopting instead a view of the 
sovereignty of the nation-state in the face of European integration as being 
‘pooled’ (MacCormick 1995 and 1999) in the light of the increasing 
interdependence between states (Krasner 1999, 3) and the supra-national level 
(Grimm 1994, 279).  
                                                 
* LLB, PhD, Barrister-at-Law. Currently a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, the European University Institute, Florence. I am grateful to 
participants of the European Forum of the Robert Schuman Centre, Between Europe and the 
Nation State: the reshaping of interests, identities and political representation  (2000-2001) 
for their constructive feedback after I gave a paper based on this article as part of the seminar 
series on The Europeanization of national and legal cultures. Particular thanks are also due to 
Matthias Mahlmann, Bruno de Witte, Neil Walker, Richard Bellamy, Hanno Kube, Christoph 
Schmid and Sue Millns for their comments on earlier versions of this article.  The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
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Law has played a part in both scenarios, that is to say, that is has been 
instrumentalised to reflect both versions of the events of the story of European 
Integration, the key-concept, or chapter, so to speak, being the role of the nation-
state. Indeed, it is the nation-state which is a vital premise of the legal reasoning 
upon which the reception of EC law into the jurisdictions of the member states is 
based. The underlying tension is as follows: either a state’s membership of the 
EU entails categorical acceptance of the supremacy doctrine, which is in itself, 
an endorsement of the hierarchical model of law. Or the state retains the right, in 
certain cases, to set the supremacy doctrine aside. Thus, even if it is accepted 
that the sovereignty of a member state has been qualified by its membership to 
the EU, it is a form of qualification which is by no means unconditional. These 
two positions represent two versions of events of the relationship between EC 
law and national law and, in the context of Germany, two competing schools of 
thought in the juridical debate concerning European integration. The term 
‘German juridical debate’ is used to denote the legal academic community
7 
which acts, in contrast to other member states of the EU, as a source of influence 
on the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht  or German Federal 
Constitutional Court (“FCC”)
8 which is, in itself, an actor in the European 
integration process of considerable influence. To a certain extent, the role of the 
court should not be overestimated, particularly given the institutional constraints 
within which judges are obliged to operate. However, it is the national 
constitutional courts of the member states of the EU which are having to 
articulate the rapport between EC and national law in an ongoing debate which 
is characterised by changing normative relationships predicated on the issue of 
the fundamental legitimacy of political power.   
 
1.1.  Etatism vs Post-Etatism 
 
The German debate concerning the need for a European constitution is a good 
illustration of the extent to which the schools of thought both form and inform 
the discussion concerning the European integration project. The first school of 
thought provides that the European Union is unable to have a constitution in 
view of it not being a state (Grimm 1995). The state is thereby viewed as being 
both the object and the prerequisite of a constitution (Isensee 1987) (Dorau & 
Jacobi 2000). Moreover, a constitution must be reflected upon by the state 
bearers of authority, the people (Staatsvolk). The pouvoir constituant is viewed 
as being absent in relation to the EU in view of the lack of a European 
Staatsvolk. The second school of thought, which I have elected to entitle ‘post-
etatistic’, provides that a prerequisite for a constitution is the existence of a 
political community (Häberle, 1999, 65).
9 Thus, the state is shaped by the 
constitution, which is defined as the basic legal order of a political system
10 The 
schools of thought also have different interpretations of the concept of 
sovereignty. 
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According to the first view, legal sovereignty is linked to the nation-state. 
The EU is viewed as ‘supra-national’ or even intergovernmental (Pechstein and 
Koenig 1998, 275) and only legitimate to the extent that it provides a 
mechanism for furthering the interests of the nation-state, including those 
associated with fundamental rights.
11 The second view is arguably tantamount to 
a cosmopolitan position given it is intrinsically a ‘post-sovereignty’ position. 
Accordingly, rights are not tied to culture or territory; thus, it is perfectly 
possible to have a legal system which is transnational or ‘trans’ state-like which 
is focussed on the interpretation and elaboration of these fundamental principles. 
 
The ultimate arbiter debate in Germany is underpinned by a tension 
between these two version of events which are retold in what Ladeur  has 
referred to as a, “traditionally state-determined discourse” (Ladeur 1997, 34). 
Thus, the ‘etatist’ view provides that EC law prevails over national law; there 
are, however, exceptions. The ‘post-etatist’ view categorically accepts the order 
of precedence of EC law. Academic opinion in Germany amongst jurists falls 
into precisely these two positions.
12 Both positions represent competing schools 
of thought in a debate which is highly vitriolic, defensive, confrontational and 
rhetorical – in effect, the staples of legal debate. However, the way in which the 
main protagonists of each school of thought claim to have the ultimate truth 
does little to foster open debate and even less to discount the accusation that 
amongst the protagonists are in effect polemicists disguised as legal scholars. 
 
This issue is particularly problematic given that it is difficult to ascertain 
the extent to which the respective backgrounds or socialisation of the main 
protagonists inform their legal reasoning. To this extent, it comes as no surprise 
that former judges of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)
13 and former 
officials of the European Commission
14 or the European Parliament
15 are at 
loggerheads with former judges of the FCC
16 concerning the interpretation of the 
effect of European integration on the German legal order. This leads inter alia to 
the participants of the German juridical debate as being perceived as being either 
‘pro’ or ‘contra’ European integration which does much to draw attention to the 
extent to which the debate is politicized but does little to dispel doubts 
concerning the ideological nature of the debate. Indeed, this author expressly 
rejects equating the distinction between an ‘etatist’ or a ‘post-etatist’ model in 
terms of ‘pro’ or ‘contra’ the European Union given that it is terminology which 
is inherently ideological and therefore has no place in a legal academic 
discussion concerning the project of European integration. The purpose of this 
next section is not to present decisions of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court concerning European integration in terms of decisions ‘for’ or ‘against’ 
the EU but to evaluate the Constitutional Court as an institutional actor which is 
instrumental in the German debate concerning European integration.  
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1.2.  A Brief Overview of the Jurisprudence of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht Concerning European Integration 
 
The jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht concerning European 
integration is prolific; a detailed appraisal of its decisions would be not only 
impossible for reasons of space but would detract from the relevancy of the 
discussion at hand. Suffice to say that the cases referred to below must be 
viewed in terms of the arguments advanced in this article and not as an 




In its Solange I decision
18, the court held that until (“solange”) the EC has 
proved itself to provide adequate protection of basic rights, the Federal 
Constitutional Court remains the ultimate arbiter concerning issues of human 
rights and would assess the level of protection afforded to human rights in 
specific
19 cases. In Solange II,
20 the Court held that the EC now had a level of 
protection of human rights which was commensurate with the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the German Basic Law which meant that the FCC relaxed its 
jurisdictional hold over questions of basic rights. As long as the general level of 
protection was secured by the ECJ, the FCC would not review the level in 
specific cases. The fundamental rights issue was not directly relevant for the 
Maastricht
21  judgement.
22 Prior to the Banana case, one could only speculate as 
to the effect of the judgment on the human rights issue. One reading of the 
case
23 is that the FCC reaffirmed the position it adopted in Solange II, that is to 
say that the FCC would only look at general cases in the event of a decrease in 
the general level of human rights protection. It was this interpretation
24 of the 
Maastricht decision which was of particular significance regarding the FCC’s 
most recent installment in its jurisprudence concerning European integration, 
namely, the Banana case.
25  
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Banana judgement in the light of the analytical 
framework within which the role and the position of the state in the process of 
European Integration is customarily interpreted by the main protagonists of the 
German academic debate. References to the previous cases concerning European 
Integration decided by the FCC shall be made for the purposes of the discussion 
only. 
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2.  THE BANANA JUDGMENT  
 
Prior to embarking on a discussion of the Banana case, it is essential to outline 
the background upon which the facts of the case were founded. 
 
2.1.  The Common Organisation for the market in Bananas 
 
The judicial attention designated to the importation of bananas verges on the 
extra-ordinary (Trachtman 1999) (Schmid 2001). Indeed, their importation into 
the EU has been assessed under national,
26 European
27 and international law
28 
thereby securing a place on the judicial agenda for almost ten years, a 
phenomenon which shows no signs of abating. The issues which are raised by 
the regulation such as protectionism – legitimate or otherwise
29  – are outside the 
remit of this article given that they are essentially trade issues.
30 A brief 
exposition of the trade nexus of the case is, however, necessary.  
 
The German case arose as a consequence of EC Regulation 442/93 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Regulation”), the objective of which was to 
create a single market in bananas.
31 This required replacing four types of 
national trade regimes: regimes of banana producers which effectively excluded 
all imports, those who protected imports from former colonies
32, those that 
imported ‘dollar’ bananas subject to tariff and lastly Germany’s trade regime 
which was based on the importation of bananas without a tariff. In short, the 
Regulation provides for price supports for EU bananas under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (“CAP”), duty-free access for African Caribbean and Pacific 
(“ACP”)
33 bananas and a tariff-quota for ‘dollar’ bananas.
34 Licenses are 
required to import both ACP and ‘dollar’ bananas and some ‘dollar’ banana 
licenses were reserved for ACP importers. In view of the fact that ‘dollar’ 
bananas are much cheaper to produce, only the 200% tariff is prohibitive. 
Germany was particularly affected by the Regulation because it had no 
producers or colonies to protect and because the price increase was greatest not 
to mention the fact that more bananas per capita are consumed in Germany than 
in any other member state. This was the reason why the German government 
opposed the protectionist line on ‘dollar’ bananas and voted against the 
regulation (Mayer, 2000, 685). 
 
The issue which the second senate of the FCC was asked to adjudicate by 
a Frankfurt Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht or “VG”), concerned 
whether the application of the Regulation
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2.2.  The Banana Case: An Overview 
 
The case at hand involved a challenge made by a group of third country banana 
importers
37 before a Frankfurt Administrative Court regarding the 
constitutionality of the conditions of trade for third countries imposed by virtue 
of the Regulation. In Germany, prior to the enactment of the regulation, the 
majority of the bananas on the market emanated from third countries.  
 
The VG referred the case first to the ECJ which was asked to ascertain to 
what extent, if at all, the Regulation was valid as a matter of EC law. The ECJ 
upheld the validity of the Regulation.
38 
 
The VG then referred the case to the FCC which was asked to consider 
whether the Regulation violates provisions contained in the German Basic Law. 
In particular, it was argued that the Regulation infringes the importing firms’ 
right to property (Article 14 (1) of the Basic Law),
39 the free exercise of a 
profession (Article 12 (1) of the Basic Law)
40 and the equality provision (Article 
3 (1) of the Basic Law).
41 As a result of the Regulation, the plaintiffs could, as of 
July 1, 1993, only import 50 % of the original amount they had imported into 
Germany. This violated their rights because of the absence of an interim 
regulation (Űbergangsregelung) which ought to have been enacted according to 
the principle of proportionality.
42  
 
The basis of the VG’s application to the FCC was that – and indeed this 
was the crux of the plaintiffs’ argument – the ECJ did not sufficiently or 
adequately protect human rights and the public international law obligations 
arising out of GATT or, in the alternative, the conduct of the European 
legislature was outside the ambit or breaches provisions contained in the EC 
Treaty, which raises the issue concerning boundaries of the order of precedence 
(Anwendungsvorrang) inherent to EC law.
43 In the VG’s opinion, a consequence 
of the Maastricht decision
44 is that the FCC secured its evaluative jurisdiction 
(Prűfungskompetenz) and its competence to set aside or nullify 
(Verwerfungskompetenz) European legal instruments on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality which it exercises in co-operation with the European Court 
of Justice.   
 
During the course of the somewhat lengthy proceedings,
45 the FCC drew 
the VG’s 
46 attention to a decision reached by the ECJ on November 26, 1996, in 
which it upheld an obligation by the Commission to enact interim measures 
(Übergangsmaβnahmen).
47 The FCC held that had the VG assessed the effect of 
the T-Port decision correctly,
48  it would have withdrawn its reference to the 
FCC on the grounds of inadmissibility, particularly as the decision involved a 
thorough evaluation of fundamental rights in the EU. Needless to say, this 
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human rights audit culminated in a finding that fundamental rights were 
sufficiently protected in the EU.  
 
In refusing to withdraw its application, the President of the VG replied to 
the FCC’s letter by stating that article 30 of the Regulation did not offer any 
relief to the violation of human rights. The sanctions offered by the decision of 
the ECJ were not specific but general in nature.
49 It is of interest to note that not 
only was it the President of the VG’s undoing that he failed to interpret the T-
Port decision correctly but he also elected to reply to the FCC’s letter without 
consulting the rest of the Chamber. The procedural rules provide that the entire 
chamber ought to have replied to the FCC’s letter. This also contributed to the 




According to the FCC, fundamental rights in the European Communities, 
as the ECJ’s decisions indicate, are sufficiently protected.
51 Moreover, this 
protection is commensurate with the protection guaranteed by the provisions of 
the German Basic Law. As long as this continues to be the case, the FCC shall 
not exercise its jurisdiction concerning the applicability of secondary EC law. 
Briefly stated, the term secondary EC law is used to denote those legal 
instruments
52 which derive their legitimacy from the EC Treaty
53 but which are 
separate, secondary forms of law. The FCC shall therefore not review secondary 
EC law
54 unless the ECJ fails to protect fundamental rights to the degree 
envisaged in Solange II.
55   
 
It is important to draw attention to the fact that the FCC’s judgment was 
consistent with the provisions of the Basic Law. An amendment to the Basic 
Law (Article 23 (1) Sentence 1),
56 which was enacted prior to both the 
Maastricht decision and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, provides 
constitutional limits to European integration. Thus, the EC Treaties and any 
secondary legislation arising therefrom should be read in the light of other 
provisions of the Basic Law, such as the provisions falling under the so-called 
‘eternity clause’
57 which contains a reference to human dignity and the value of 
human life
58 as well as to the federal, democratic and social principles upon 
which the Federal Republic of Germany is founded.
59 The eternity clause 
provides that these principles may not be set aside by the legislature.
60 
 
In order for a challenge to succeed before the FCC, a court must prove 
that the European legal development, which includes the decisions of the ECJ 
taken after the Solange II decision, has sunk below the necessary level of basic 
rights protection.
61 This necessitates reconciling basic rights protection at the 
national level with the European level according to the method envisaged by the 
FCC in Solange II. The FCC held that not only had the VG failed to undertake 
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such an assessment but also the ECJ’s case law illustrated that basic rights are 
sufficiently protected at the level of the EU.
62 The court further held that the VG 
had misinterpreted the Maastricht decision.
63 
 
The questions addressed in the Maastricht decision do, to some extent, 
overlap with those raised in the Banana case. The judgements are, however, by 
no means interchangeable. Maastricht concerned the issue of competence of the 
German state, under its constitution to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. By contrast, 
the Banana case was based on the issue of fundamental rights. Whereas these 
issues are substantively different, they both raise the question of the ultimate 
arbiter. 
 
3.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BANANA CASE 
 
It is of interest to note that the ease with which the FCC dealt with the human 
rights issue in a case which was essentially based on competence - albeit obiter 
dicta – was noticeably absent in the Banana case. That is to say, that it elected 
not to address the issue of competence by way of obiter dicta in a case based on 
fundamental rights, a move which would have been in line with the tactics it 
adopted in its Maastricht decision. It is arguable that this was a deliberate move 
on behalf of the court to signal a stance vis à vis European integration which is, 
in contrast to the Maastricht  decision, inherently positive, undoubtedly 
explained by inter alia the absence of the infamous architect of the Maastricht 
judgment,  Paul Kirchhof
64 who retired from the FCC prior to the judgment 
being reached and whose particular understanding of the German state informed 
much of the FCC’s case law regarding European integration. Kirchhof is all too 
often demonised in the general legal debate concerning European integration.
65 
In Germany, this is accentuated by the polarity of the juridical debate where is 
he regarded as either a friend or foe.
66 References to Kirchhof in this article are 
not designed to perpetuate this practice. They are made to outline the analytical 
context of the German juridical debate concerning European integration within 
which he enjoys considerable standing. Indeed, his theory of the state exerts 
considerable influence over German constitutional theory and German 
constitutional lawyers.
67 To demonise him or to dismiss him as anachronistic is 
to underestimate the weight of a particular strand of  German state theory which 
continues to inform the German legal response to the challenge of European 
integration. Be that as it may, if, as has been suggested by some, the Banana 
decision is to be regarded as being as ‘pro’ EU as the FCC was able to be under 
the circumstances, it was not necessarily because Kirchhof retired before the 
judgement was reached. First, it is likely that in reaching its decision, the FCC 
was all too aware that the Regulation will eventually have to be amended 
anyway in view of the consistent rulings by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in which US challenges have repeatedly been upheld.
68 Secondly, the 
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optimism which the ‘pro’ EU position vis à vis the Banana decision may - or 
may not - engender must, however, be viewed in the light of certain 
qualifications which the FCC elected to attach to its ‘pro’ EU stance by way of 
procedure, the co-operation relationship with the ECJ
69 and its particular 
interpretation of human rights. 
 
3.1.  Review and Article 100 (1) of the Basic Law 
 
In essence, the court held in the Banana case that secondary European 
Community legislation is a matter for the ECJ and does not constitute an 
appropriate basis for review under article 100 (1) of the Basic Law.
70 Ordinarily 
speaking, applications under article 100 (1) relate to the formal legislation 
arising out of the constitution both at the level of the Federation and of the 
individual Länder or States.
71 The Federal Constitutional court has the exclusive 
competence to adjudicate on the constitutionality of national laws.
72 An issue of 
central importance in the case concerned the appropriateness of the application 
of article 100 (1) vis à vis secondary EC legislation. 
 
The VG’s position was that such measures do not fall under article 100 
(1)
73 and that it would be preferable to have a separate legal provision which 
would enable courts to consider the reviewability of secondary EC law. 
Regarding the case at hand, it was, however, willing to apply article 100 (1) in 
order to fill the gap.
74 The FCC’s response was that applications under article 
100 (1) are inadmissible unless the level of the protection of fundamental rights 
protection generally sinks
75 thereby rejecting the VG’s argument in favour of a 
separate legal procedure concerning the reviewability of secondary EC 
legislation.  
 
The FCC’s response left little doubt concerning its interpretation of the 
application of article 100 (1) in that it reinforced the position it adopted in the 
Maastricht case
76, that is to say that it regards those acts of the Community 
which have been transposed into German law as reviewable. It is significant to 
note that the FCC in effect avoided further developing a mechanism according 
to which it could realise a vision which it initially outlined in the Maastricht 
case, the so-called ‘co-operation relationship’ which, according to the FCC, 
constitutes the supervisory jurisdiction concerning the protection of fundamental 
rights
77 which it exercises in co-operation with the ECJ.  
 
3.2.  The  Co-operation Relationship between the FCC and the ECJ 
 
It is arguable that the co-operation relationship between the FCC and the ECJ 
has remained a vision given the absence of both guidelines and consensus as to 
how it ought to function.
78 The relationship is, however, not as nebulous as 
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appears to be the case as it is the FCC which decides as to how and when the co-
operation relationship ought to be exercised. It is here that a point of what 
appears to be mere procedure in effect underlines an interpretation of the co-
operation relationship which undoubtedly favours the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. Thus, whilst appearing to be inclusive, it is in effect 
exclusive.  
 
This is particularly apposite given the court’s interpretation of article 100 
(1) of the Basic Law.
79 It could, after all, have elected to address the VG’s 
argument in favour of a separate legal procedure governing the reviewability of 
secondary EC legislation and thereby develop the co-operation relationship 
further instead of restricting itself to making a minor amendment as to 
language.
80 One explanation may be that had the court addressed the issue of a 
separate procedure, it may have been forced to take into account a provision of 
the EC Treaty which is arguably the blue-print for a legal framework within 
which the co-operation between the FCC and the ECJ can most effectively take 
place, namely, the preliminary reference procedure whereby any national court 
may refer a question to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of the EC Treaty 
and legislation arising therefrom (article 234 EC Treaty).
81  
 
Indeed, it is of interest to note that the FCC has never addressed article 
234 EC in the light of its concept of the co-operation relationship (Everling, 
1999, 225) probably because to accept article 234 EC as underpinning the co-
operation relationship would represent a concession by way of an acceptance of 
a legal framework in which the ECJ is the ultimate arbiter to the extent that it is 
based on the EC Treaty as opposed to the German Basic law. 
 
In the Banana judgement, the FCC in effect reserves the right to 
ultimately decide whether human rights at the level of the European Union are 
commensurate with the human rights standards provided for by the German 
Basic Law. Moreover, it is the FCC’s standard as regards the level of human 
rights protection which prevails
82 - a form of ‘constitutional patriotism’ if you 
will in the sense that as regards human rights, there is ‘no place like home’.
83 
 
The absence of a Charter of Human Rights in the EU which is legally 
binding arguably justifies the move by a member state’s constitutional court to 
scrutinise human rights in the EU until, to paraphrase the Solange decision, they 
are adequately safeguarded at the level of the EU.
 84 What seems clear from the 
German Constitutional court decisions is that it is the constitutional courts of the 
member states who remain the ultimate arbiters regarding this issue. This gives 
rise to the following question: to what extent, if at all, is this view premised on 
the view held by the judges that their legal systems are fundamentally and 
essentially distinct and must therefore remain ‘intact’ and ‘untouched’ against 
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outside influence, a notion which is reminiscent of the debates concerning the 
politics of identity and controversies governing models of integration. It is this 
tension which lies at the heart of the tension between the two competing schools 
of thought concerning European integration, namely, the ‘etatistic’ school vs. 
the ‘post-etatistic’school.  
 
As regards the co-operation relationship, the schools of thought may be 
contrasted as follows: according to the first view, the ECJ is granted a sense of 
delegated power in the mechanism for furthering the interests of the German 
state in co-operation with the FCC. The FCC, however, reserves the right to 
argue that the ECJ is not safeguarding fundamental rights sufficiently,
85 a 
position which is consistent with its Solange II and its Maastricht decision. The 
‘post-etatistic’ view provides to the contrary, and is characterised by a weakness 
in the ECJ’s position that it does not, as yet, have an appropriate legal basis for 
such ‘cosmopolitan’ legal reasoning, something which the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights may remedy.
86 Be that as it may, both schools of thought 
are based on separate premises and thereby reach different conclusions, which is 
in itself, not uncommon in academic debates. The juridical debate in Germany 
as regards the effect of European integration is, however, polarised to such an 
extent that it militates against an open discussion based on an exchange of ideas 
primarily because the positions taken are adopted in such a way as to render 
them irreconcilable, conceptually speaking. 
 
Fundamental rights are a good illustration of the tension between the two 
schools of thought. The purpose of the next section is to assess the human rights 
nexus of the Banana case.  
 
3.3.  A Human Rights Audit of the EU 
 
The human rights issues which arise as part of the Banana case are mainly two-
fold. First, the appropriate human rights audit envisaged by the FCC must satisfy 
an evidentiary burden which may, in effect, be difficult, if not impossible for 
certain national courts to discharge
87 given that it must inter alia include a 
detailed evaluation of the ECJ’s case law since 1986. It is questionable whether 
lower courts would have the resources to undertake an audit such as that 
envisaged by the FCC. In effect, the FCC thereby sends a message to the lower 
courts for them not to refer cases based on fundamental rights. This does not, 
however, prevent courts referring cases based on questions of competence. The 
main issues raised in the Maastricht decision are left open. Indeed, the FCC 
omitted to address the distinction between Maastricht  and the Banana case 
thereby sidestepping the issue of competence altogether. 
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Secondly, the FCC only refers to decisions of the ECJ case law since 
1986. This is questionable for a number of reasons. First, whereas the decisions 
of the ECJ since 1986 illustrate the increasing nexus of human rights in the EU, 
and by no means indicate a substantive inadequacy of the rights adjudicated 
upon, the rights jurisprudence of the ECJ is selective, and is by no means 
comprehensive. Indeed, the court has had very little to go on until now 
concerning human rights notwithstanding the fact that the EC Treaty does 
contain some basic rights.
88 Be that as it may, the FCC’s reference to the case 
law of the ECJ as an indicator of the level of the protection of fundamental 
rights in the EU is by no means consistent with its previous practice, a matter 
which the tenor of the Banana judgement does little to underline. Indeed, in 
Solange I, the FCC omitted to refer to the Nold decision of the ECJ which had 
been decided two weeks prior to the FCC’s decision in which the ECJ explicitly 
underlined that fundamental rights belong to the general principles of EC law 
and that it would draw on the common constitutional traditions of the member 
states as a source of inspiration.
89 One wonders to what extent a re-affirmation 
by the FCC of the line it took in Solange II, is part of a principled approach, and 
if so, what are the principles which permit the FCC to vest its trust in the ECJ 
vis à vis human rights in some of its judgements but not in others? The difficulty 
in gauging the nature of the principles upon which the FCC includes the 
decisions of other institutional actors in the European integration process is 
further illustrated by the FCC’s omission in the Banana case to address the 
human rights record of the other EC institutions.  
 
It is arguable that a human rights audit ought to include an assessment of 
legislative acts that have been passed by all EC institutions, that is to say, it 
ought to look beyond the jurisprudence of the ECJ. It is submitted that a 
thorough human rights audit of the EU would necessitate a panoramic audit of 
the EC institutions as regards basic rights, something which it had in fact 
undertaken it is previous decision in the Solange II case in which it not only 
referred to the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the ECJ but also drew 
attention to the Common Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission of the European Communities of April 5 1977 regarding 
fundamental rights and the Declaration of the European Council on Democracy 
of April 7 and 8 1978.
90 It is of further interest to note that the FCC also failed to 
refer to the decision-making process of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights
91 signed in December at the Nice Summit which is questionable because 
a human rights audit ought to be prospective as well as retrospective.
92 
 
Be that as it may, fundamental rights provide a useful illustration of the 
tension between the two schools of thought given that their protection is viewed 
by some as being the role of ‘homogenous constitutions’, that is to say, the 
constitutions of the member states. To what extent, however, is this premised on 
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an essentialist conception of human rights? The ‘etatist’ view emphasises the 
distinctiveness of a state which is perceived as being based on a Staatsvolk
93 as 
well as culture, which is defined in terms of language, religion, art and history 
(Kirchhof 1993, 79). This distinctiveness is, however, instrumentalised in order 
to draw boundaries which must be protected in the face of European integration. 
Indeed, law is viewed as pivotal in enabling the state to maintain an openness 
towards the European ideal (Europaoffenheit) whilst, at the same time, ensuring 
that the state does not ‘dissolve’ (Kirchhof 1993, 64) a phenomenon which is 
referred to be some as Enstaatlichung  (Kirchhof 1993, 95), which clearly 
illustrates the defensive tenor of the ‘etatist’ position
94 despite appearances to 
the contrary. Thus, whilst appeals for the ability of constitutional courts to listen, 
to question and to understand regarding the debate concerning the European 
integration project (Kirchhof 1999, 353) are articulated - thereby appearing to be 
inclusive – the position is, in effect, exclusive as it is precisely language and 




Aside from cultural influences, and the different historical processes 
which led to the drafting of the respective constitutions, the assumption which 
prevails is that the conceptions contained therein are so distinct or ‘essential’ 
that they merit vigorous protection, a position which is supported by certain 
strands of state theory. Thus, Hegel writes of the special historical role of people 
in history (Hegel 1983, § 344) which is a consequence of the dialectical 
development of Spirit. There are the Völkergeister (Hegel 1983, § 352) which 
denote the special differentiated modes of the existence of people, that is to say, 
there is such a thing as the ‘Germanness’ of Germans, the ‘Englishness of the 
English’ and so on which play their role on the stage of world history (Hegel 
1983, § 274). 
 
To allow for ‘outside’ influences would further contribute to the 
‘withering away’ of the state’s sovereignty. This is not a rejection of the 
universality of human rights but is premised on the position that some states 
protect human rights more vigorously than others. Moreover, - so the argument 
continues – some states have protected certain rights which are, as in the case of 
the protection of economic rights in the German Basic Law, for example, not to 
be found in the constitutions of other states, a position which must, in order to 
be understood more fully, be viewed in relation to the context of the German 
juridical debate concerning European integration. The purpose of the next 
section is to assess to what extent, if at all, there is a corollary between the 
concept of a unitary, homogenous state and a juridical debate concerning 
European integration which its proponents seek to ensure is also unitary and 
homogenous as opposed to being able to accommodate a plurality of views. 
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4.  SITUATING THE GERMAN JURIDICAL DEBATE 
CONCERNING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
The judicial and extra-judicial debate in Germany concerning European 
integration has traditionally focussed on the ultimate arbiter issue, as the FCC’s 
Solange I and II decisions illustrate. The juridical debate concerning normative 
collisions between European and national law in Germany has also secured a 
place in the public sphere. Indeed, the issues surrounding the Banana case were 
indirectly being discussed by judges - seized of the matter and otherwise – in 
national newspapers long before the decision was reached
96 leading some 
commentators to cast doubt as to the independence of one judge in particular, 
Paul Kirchhof, who, though not directly involved in the preparation of the 
Banana case, made it clear to the media which line the FCC would adopt 
regarding its adjudication. Questions concerning the independence of the 
judiciary undoubtedly arise and are, in this context, legitimate. The observations 
made in respect of this issue are mainly two-fold.   
 
First, the position in Germany is that whereas judges of the FCC are 
permitted to make statements as academics
97 they may not comment on cases 
which their chamber is adjudicating on in a private capacity.
98  Indeed, it is 
difficult to interpret comments made by Kirchhof in an interview in the light of 
his  Professorial capacity,
99 an issue which was commented upon by other 
commentators (Everling 1999, 225) and which was fiercely rebutted by Kirchhof 
(Kirchhof 1999, 353). Indeed, this Contretemp is a good illustration of how a 
conflict between the two schools of thought concerning the role of the German 
state in the European integration project can spill over into the personal sphere, 
that is to say that the border between remarks made ad rem and remarks made 
ad personam becomes easily blurred. Thus, the personal is, to a limited extent, 
political, leading one to consider to what extent doubts raised as to the 
independence of the judiciary in relation to the FCC are founded. For reasons of 
space, it is impossible to conduct a detailed discussion concerning the issue of 
judicial bias and the FCC as a whole. However, the issue in itself draws 
attention to the extent to the politicisation of the judiciary which is undoubtedly 
connected to the particular notion of the Rechtsstaat in which courts rather than 
politicians make important choices regarding European integration (Kokott 
1998, 92). This is particularly apposite concerning the German Federal 
Constitutional court, whose role as an institutional actor has been the focus of 
considerable attention both within (Ladeur 2000) and outwith academic 
circles.
100 The question concerning to what extent the influence of the judiciary 
is inordinate is poised at the axis of the relationship between judges and 
democracy. There is no doubt that judges with dominant personalities can and 
have influenced the debate concerning European integration in Germany – and 
they may well continue to do so.
101 This is statement is very much in line with 
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the concept of new constitutionalism which provides for a model of ‘checks and 
balances’ by constitutional courts regarding acts of parliaments and the notion of 
constitutional review as a method according to which parliamentary sovereignty 
is qualified (Stone Sweet 2000, 50). This does, however, bring with it 
concomitant problems of democratic legitimacy if one accepts that judges and 
lawyers alike are supposed to be beneath the law and not, as the juridical debate 
concerning the project of European integration in Germany testifies, above it. It 
is arguable that the influence judges in Germany exert over the European 
integration debate is disproportionate.  
 
The respective backgrounds of the protagonists of the schools of thought 
are, to a certain extent, relevant whether they are former judges of the ECJ
102 or 
former officials of the European Commission
103 and the European Parliament
104 
or former judges of the FCC.
105 The debate concerning the effect of European 
integration on the German legal order is, however, not exclusively a product of 
the protagonists’ conditioning. Be that as it may, it is submitted that the 
protagonists should not be discounted or discredited by virtue of their 
professional backgrounds; if anything, their experience provides an essential 
source of information for the debate. Moreover, the juridical debate concerning 
European integration ought to be structured in such a way as to facilitate open 
debate and the exchange of ideas and where dissent can be accommodated.  
 
The difficulty in the German context is mainly two-fold. First, the debate 
is inherently confrontational. A model based on mediation would arguably be 
preferable. This would, however, involve challenging the terms of reference of 
the German debate as a whole, namely, law as a science or Rechtswissenschaft. 
This is the second point. Thus, definitions used regarding the academic 
discipline of law in Germany are derived from the terminology used in standard 
scientific enquiry inherent to the natural sciences. Scientific reasoning has 
traditionally been defined as being based on ordered, deductive thought as 
opposed to inductive knowledge acquired through belief or hearsay (Medawer 
1984, 3). The implication is that scientists deal with the hard currency of facts as 
opposed to the loose change of opinions. The true scientist seeks truth – we 
might, however, reiterate Pontius Pilate in asking ‘what is truth’. The ‘legal 
scientist’ would answer: ‘that which is shown to be true by way of scientific 
reasoning.’
106 There is, however, a basis of preference,
107 namely, the ‘etatist’ or 
the ‘post-etatist’ basis which creates a tension by way of a continuous fight for 
‘core rationality’ of the ‘scientific’ enterprise concerning European integration. 
The word scientific appears in brackets as an acknowledgement of an integral 
element inherent to legal reasoning, namely, that of rhetoric. Legal argument is 
after all, designed to persuade. As regards the matter at hand, a debate which is 
underpinned by ideological differences concerning statehood is presented as a 
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debate based on ‘scientific’ argument or in other words, on legal positivist 
argument (Stone Sweet 2000, 143) 
 
This undoubtedly contributes to eroding a positivist view of legal 
reasoning which is not in itself surprising, particularly given that the stakes in a 
debate about sovereignty are high. Thus, legal reasoning is, to some extent, 
instrumentalised in positing differing accounts of the fundamental legitimacy of 
political authority. Thus, for example, the ‘etatist’ school regards each 
constitutional court as having a particular notion of human rights which must be 
viewed in the ‘cultural context’ of its state. It goes one step further, however, to 
the extent that it uses the context argument to adopt what can only be described 
as a protectionist view not only of rights but also of values as a cultural heritage 
which may not be relinquished inspite of transfers of sovereignty to the supra-
national level of the EU. This issue is pivotal as regards the discussion at hand 
as it underlines the ‘identity politics’ nexus of the sovereignty debate. 
Accordingly, the values which underpin human rights are regarded as being an 
intrinsic element of the state’s identity and it is this which is both articulated not 
only in decisions of constitutional courts, such as the FCC, but also in the 
academic sovereignty debate as a whole. The terminology of the sovereignty 
debate, namely, whether pooled, shared, split or partial do little to draw attention 
to the fact that what is being fought over is the identity of the nation state. In 
other words: we (the nation-state) are who WE say we are and WE reserve the 
ability to define who WE are.
108 Further, we can not permit others to define who 
we are as defining our identity is our sovereign right. It is this tension upon 
which the two opposing perceptions of the relationship between EC law and 
national law is based in Germany, namely, whether they are ‘distinct’. In other 
words: EC law and national law – one legal order or two? And as regards its 
corollary: one system of values or two? As regards the EU, this formulation 
ought arguably be extended by substituting certain elements. Thus, one legal 
order or 16? The same applies to values: one system of values or 16? 
Philosophers would not doubt dismiss this as a reformulation of the age old 
debate concerning universalism and relativism. For lawyers, the age old debate 
has concrete implications, particularly given the fact that they are now faced 
with a Charter of Fundamental Rights post-Nice. The comments being made 
have been extended to the legal debate concerning European integration as a 
whole and are not limited to the German context. The German context is 
instructive, however, to the extent that it illustrates the underlying tension of the 
sovereignty debate as a whole, namely, that of identity politics. 
 
The etatist state is delineated the ‘ultimate boundary’ which refers to a 
state which may be open to the extent that international obligations must be 
honoured but which is ultimately predicated on the consensus of all bodies of 
the state concerning the overall unity, dare one say, supremacy, of the state 
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(Isensee 1993, 122). One is reminded of the writings of Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 
1928) which have arguably informed many of the FCC’s decisions (Weiler 
1995) including the Maastricht decision. This is perhaps explained by the fact 
that the reporting judge in the latter case has a particularly impressive reputation 
as a Schmitt scholar. The influence of Schmitt on the jurisprudence of the FCC 
and indeed on German state theory as a whole (Preuss 1993) must not, however, 
be over-estimated or indeed exaggerated. The initial premise of the ‘etatist’ 
school, namely, the legal strength of Europe lies in its states (Kirchhof 1991, 12) 
is not a direct legacy of Schmitt. Be that as it may, the original basis and 
dependable guarantee of human rights of freedom secured by the rule of law, 
democratic legitimacy and the social equalization are the constitutional states 
which have bound their sovereignty in a constitutional law manner and have also 
laid it open to the influence of public international law (Kirchhof 1993, 63). 
Accordingly, whereas it is accepted that the state is not ‘an island’’, the ground 
of applicability
109 regarding European Community law remains the German 
constitution. Indeed, for Kirchhof, the ultimate authority rests with what he 
refers to as ‘homogenous constitutions’. Alternatively put, this is tantamount to 
the view of the EU as a ‘union of sovereign states’ or the societas of states 
(Jackson 1999, 449) a view which rests on the prevailing view of the EU as a 
supra-national organization which is very much in line with the ‘etatist’ school 
of thought. Accordingly, a constitution may not exist without a state. The EU is 
not a state therefore it does not have a constitution. Law is thereby intrinsically 
linked to the state,
110 a view which is reminiscent of the classical ‘law without a 
state’ controversy of inter alia Weimar days
111 in which law was also viewed as 
being capable of existing both within and outwith the state (Pernice 2000). This 
is not to say that the state is viewed as anachronistic but that obligations arising 
as a consequence of the EU for instance qualify or to draw from MacCormick, 
‘go beyond’ the state (MacCormick, 1995). This contrasting theory of the state 
is predicated on the view of the state being porous, of being able to transcend the 
boundary to the extent that it is not hermetically sealed, not fully independent, 
having endowed the EU with their sovereign authority, possibly pointing 
towards an emergent universitas (Jackson 1999, 451).  
 
The reference made to the controversy of the Weimar  days must be 
qualified to the extent that it is not made in order to portray Kelsen as a 
nationalist just as it is not aimed at portraying Egon Ehrlich as an 
internationalist. Rather, presenting them aids distinguishing both theories of the 
state outlined above on the basis of what one considers as law. Thus, for Kelsen, 
the legal positivist stance provides that the law is constituted by the laws – for 
Ehrlich, this definition is too narrow and he elects to tease out a definition which 
includes other forms of social control, a stance which has been taken up by more 
recently by the legal pluralists (Teubner 1992, 1443). Both views of law, 
however, are based on a theory of the state. For Kelsen, who adopts the 
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hierarchical model for law inspired by his infamous Grundnorm, the state is not 
as impermeable or porous as it is in Ehrlich’s vision. Indeed, a hierarchical 
model for legal reasoning is rendered impossible by a legal pluralist perspective 
which instead adopts a ‘heterarchy of diverse legal discourses’ (Teubner 1992, 
1451). There is a tendency, however, for the analyses which underpin legal 
pluralist accounts of law to underestimate the influence of the state on legal 
reasoning, which arguably derives from the unifying role which law played in 
state formation during the 19
th century. This role, however, was a relatively 
recent phenomenon as law originally transcended the boundary of the state.  
 
4.1.  The Role of the Nation-State in Legal Reasoning 
 
Lawyers tend to think of law in terms of the nation-state. Indeed, the nation-state 
lies at the apex of legal reasoning.
112 Few legal disciplines encourage the legal 
profession to think beyond the limits of their national legal training, a notable 
exception being the discipline of public international law and comparative law 
not to mention the recent development of supra-national legal bodies such as the 
arbitration authority established by the World Trade Organisation.
113 Turning 
our attention to comparative lawyers - 
 there is no doubt that comparative law 
fosters the pursuit of ideas. The ratio of this discipline, however, remains the 
domestic legal system which is first and foremost the point of departure of this 
form of legal analysis which encourages a compartmentalised view of law along 
the lines of the nation-state. Jurists in the 17th and 18th centuries made use of 
the same legal grammar as part of the ius commune (Zimmermann 1996, 576). 
The common language was of course latin, and the common heritage was 
Roman law (Hondius 1998, 8) which arguably constituted a unified, European 
culture (Zimmermann 1994, 82). The purpose of this next section is to evaluate 
the link between law and the nation-state and the concomitant effect on legal 
reasoning as a whole. 
 
4.2.  Cosmopolitan Legal Reasoning? 
 
Justinian’s corpus iuris civilis and the first European university at Bologna, the 
so-called universitas magistorum et scholarium, were pivotal in the gestation of 
law as a discipline (Wesel 1984, 64-65).
114 which was based on Roman and 
Canon law. Thus, law or legal reasoning was rooted in the notion that it was an 
application of legal principles instead of being territorially based within a 
context constituted by customary law, a project which we would now term as 
being a quest for universals.
115  
 
During the nineteenth century, German legal scholars were trained in 
roman law and canon law and not in local customary law, regardless of where 
they came from in Germany primarily due to the influence of the church and 
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Roman law.
116 Lawyers who had completed their legal training in one country 
could occupy a chair in another (Zimmermann 1998, 27). The German case is 
partly explained because there was no single Germanic law or people at this 
time. Indeed, the German state as a single entity, namely, the German Reich, 
was only founded as late as 1871 (Wesel 1984, 66). Thus, in 1495 when the 
Reichskammergericht was established the judges had to swear that they would 
uphold the common law of the Reich thereby acknowledging its primacy over 
the individual laws of the German territories. The reason for this is not 
exclusively to do with geography but also refers to the evolution of law as a 
science, namely, the implementation of rational, supra-regional, and neutral 
laws. The German jurists who had studied in Italy excelled in the formal rigour 
of legal reasoning which was not dependent on a local context but on 
methodical, disciplined scientific reasoning.
117 To conclude: a common 
European legal culture which centered around a common legal science did once 
exist (Zimmermann 1998, 27), an issue which is overlooked by those jurists 
who, like Kirchhof, continue to argue in favour of the distinctiveness of their 
respective legal systems on the basis of cultural arguments.   
 
Legal reasoning according to principles was, however, reversed at the turn 
of the nineteenth century for it was at this time that the nation-state as defined 
by territorial, essential, a priori elements prevailed. The instrumentalisation of 
law for the purpose of state-building are still very much part of the heritage of 
legal science. It is a heritage which must, however, not only be challenged, but 
must also be qualified in the face of the increasing inter-dependency of states in 
the light of globalisation. A challenge could arguably draw on a number of 
sources. Thus, for instance, it could draw from Kant’s concept of the Weltbürger 
(Kant 1991, 172-173) in order to assess to what extent it gives rise to a possible 
corollary of a Weltjurist. According to Kant, the rationality behind an 
international community is based on a principle of right as opposed to a 
philanthropic principle. Thus, this is not an ethical principle but a legal 
principle. Moreover, Kant maintains that if sovereign states could agree in 
certain legal principles embodied in an international binding agreement, a new 
and just legal order for all mankind could develop (Kant 1795). This position is 
not dissimilar to the arguments taken up as part of the debate concerning 
cosmopolitan citizenship which is based on a rejection of the Westphalian 
system of governance (Linklater 1998) which recognises the sovereignty of 
states as being absolute
118 which was qualified by inter alia the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights which accords inalienable rights to people 
irrespective of membership of a state. Thus, cosmopolitan citizenship recognises 
trans- or post-national agents (Archibugi & Held 1995). As regards legal theory, 
one is again reminded of Eugen Ehrlich’s emphasis on the independence of law 
from the nation-state, that is to say, law exists independently from the 
framework of the nation-state (Ehrlich 1975) which can be contrasted to Kelsen, 
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for instance, who believed that law may only be realised within the hierarchical 
structures of the state (Kelsen 1967). This tension underpins the current 
convergence debate in which the substantial degree of convergence between the 
legal systems of the member states (Beatson & Trimidas 1998, 169) (Markesinis 
1994) not to mention mergers between those who serve them (Trubeck, Dezalay, 
Buchanan and Davis 1994) is assessed. The purpose of this article is not to 
evaluate the arguments for and against the convergence thesis, particularly given 
that its applicability as regards EU law are limited. The terms of reference of the 
convergence debate are very narrow and are difficult to extend to the framework 
of the EU, particularly as the debate centers on the quest for a European Civil 
Code which is premised on the law of obligations and the law of contract which 
ignores other aspects of private law
119 and also ignores most realms of public 
law
120 and omits to address the EU dynamic as a whole. The discussion of the 
ius commune conducted above serves a particular purpose and is not being used 
as an example or as evidence of a future trend. Rather, it is designed to illustrate 
the link between law and the nation-state which, particularly as regards the 
German debate concerning European integration, is regarded as being intrinsic. 
In effect, this restricts the debate in such a way that alternative conceptions of 
law have no standing such as a pluralist position, for example, in which 
agreement can be reached regarding the similarity of key concepts such as 
fundamental rights, namely, which go beyond national perceptions of these 
concepts.
121 The German debate is structured in such a way so that such 
considerations are noticeably absent which is partly explained by the loyalty to 
the nation-state or Rechtspatriotismus (Aziz 2000, 473) which legal education 
fosters by providing access to knowledge and the opportunity to be educated 
within the constraints of the state, which arguably explains why lawyers 
primarily identify with institutions of the nation-state (Ramirez & Boli 1987, 
2).
122   
 
The FCC Banana decision is a case in point. Whereas the FCC referred to 
the GATT in its judgement, it omitted to address the WTO which is questionable 
particularly given that the WTO has adjudicated on the banana regulation.
123 
This is not mitigated by the fact that the VG did not refer to the WTO in its 
reference to the FCC as the FCC is not bound by the reference made to it and 
has the discretion to consider any such issue it regards relevant for the 
adjudication of the reference made to it. One response to this argument would no 
doubt question the necessity of a national constitutional court whose role it is to 
adjudicate on the constitution of the state in which it is based and would perhaps 
even go as far as to argue that taking decisions by legal instances beyond its 
boundaries would be beyond both the court’s remit if not its competence. 
Indeed, why would the WTO be relevant in a case which was based on 
fundamental rights? It is not the role of the WTO to assess the compatibility of 
EC law with WTO law. The importation of bananas, as far was the WTO was 
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concerned, was a trade issue. Be that as it may, it is of interest to speculate to 
what extent, if at all, the same decision would be taken differently in 10 years 
time. This appears to be a minor point but draws on the socialisation of jurists. It 
may well be the case in the future, jurists will be encouraged to look beyond 
their domestic legal system, an issue which has been addressed in the context of 
the use of comparative judicial decisions in human rights cases in jurisdictions 
that have relatively recently incorporated human rights provisions that are 
significantly enforced, such as the case of the United Kingdom (McCrudden 
2000, 499). This would undoubtedly concur with the legal pluralist model which 
would accept the position of the nation-state amongst other jurisdictions and 
would in fact encourage taking decisions of other legal instances seized of the 




As a consequence of the Banana judgement, the FCC sends a message to the 
lower courts for them not to refer cases based on fundamental rights. This does 
not, however, prevent courts from referring cases based on questions of 
competence. Thus, the main issues raised by the Maastricht decision are left 
open. In reaffirming its Solange II decision, the FCC does, however, outline its 
understanding of the co-operation relationship with the ECJ which it first 
referred to in Maastricht. Thus, the FCC reserves the right to assess the 
commensurability between fundamental rights protected in the EU with those 
enshrined in the German Basic Law, which illustrates that it has a particular 
interpretation of the notion of co-operation. This interpretation of the 
relationship is, as this article has shown, a product of a German juridical debate 
concerning the European integration project which is underpinned by conflicts 
as to the interpretation concerning the role of the state. Both the ‘etatist’ and the 
‘post-etatist’ schools of thought outlined in this article are underpinned by the 
tension between a conception of sovereignty as ‘lost’ or ‘regained’, a binary 
combination which is inappropriate as regards the process of European 
integration as a whole. Indeed, the German example can be extrapolated to the 
debates both within and outwith the member states of the EU, albeit within 
different parameters and contexts. The importance of comparative work, 
particularly as regards constitutional courts which belong to the dominant 
institutional actors in the project of European integration is hereby 
acknowledged. The lesson to be learned from the German example may be 
summarised thus: that the challenge is to what extent the juridical debate may be 
structured in such a way so that it can accommodate a variety of views whilst at 
the same time acknowledging the controversial nature and the contestablity of 
the European integration project. 
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Indeed, the issue which the German juridical debate ought to address is to 
what extent, if at all, it can accommodate alternative positions such as, for 
example, a pragmatic legal pluralist position which regards sovereignty as being 
shared and which upholds the necessity for jurisdictional dialogue and for some 
debate over the interpretation / specification of rights within specific contexts. 
This context would, however, be a German – European context in which 
German interests are also defined by Germany and not simply vice-versa. The 
status quo as regards the German juridical debate is, however, that it is 
confrontational to such an extent that it inhibits a plurality of views, which 
detracts from the quality of the debate that it is liable to be regarded as 
anachronistic, not only by their other European counterparts but also by their 
own politicians (Däubler-Gmelin 1999, 84). Thus, whilst German jurists bicker 
about the terms of reference for the debate, politicians have seized the initiative 
in formulating a vision of Europe which represents a clear signal that the 
moment has come to move beyond classical conceptions of constitutionalism 
which are umbilically linked to the state.
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the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). See inter alia European Communities-
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Complaint by the United States 
WT/DS27/R/USA, May 22, 1997. For a summary see 
http://www.wio.org/wto/dispute/Bulletin.htm at no.7. Moreover, on April 12, 1999 a WTO 
dispute settlement panel issued a series of decisions in which it attempted to resolve 
successfully the conflict: European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Art. 21.5 by Ecuador WT/DS27/RW/ECU, April 12, 
1999: European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
Recourse to Article 21.5 by the European Communities WT/DS27/RW/EEC, April 12, 1999. 
For the reports see generally http://www.wto.org. 
29 Independent studies by the World Bank have, for example, concluded that the restrictions 
concerning importation of bananas into the EU costs the consumer approximately 2,3 Billion 
Dollars a year by virtue of the prices which are artificially high. See Borrell (1994). 
30 See generally Everling (1996).  
31 I would like to thank Alasdair Young for his comments regarding this section. 
32 Or a combination with the first group. 
33 As provided for under the Lomé Convention which provides special concessions to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP). The current Convention is Lomé IV [1991] OJ L229 & 
[1998] OJ L156. See Protocol 5 for the rules governing bananas. See Smith (2000). 
34 One fixed-value tariff equivalent to approximately 20% for imports within the quota and 
one fixed value tariff of about 200% for imports beyond the quota.  
35 Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the 
market in bananas, OJEC 1993 No. L 47, p.1-11 and also Regulation 1442/93. 
36 BVerfG, 2 BvL 1/97 vom 7 June 2000, Absatz-Nr. (1-69), http://www.berfg.de/. 
37 Referred to as the Atlanta Group. 
38 Case C-466/93 Atlanta EuZW 1995, 836. 
39 Article 14 (1) provides that, “Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their 
content and limits are determined by statute.” All translations of the German Basic Law are 
taken from the version reproduced at www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gm00000.html. See 
generally Michalowski & Woods (1999, 299 – 312). 
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40 Article 12 (1) provides that, “All Germans have the right to freely choose their occupation, 
their place of work, and their place of study or training. The practice of an occupation can be 
regulated by or pursuant to a statute.” See also Michalowski & Woods (1999, 319 – 332). 
41 Article 3 (1) provides that, “All humans are equal before the law.” 
42 See para 40 of the decision in which the court refers to a previous decision of the FCC: 
BVerfGE 58, 300 (351). 
43 See para 30 of the decision. 
44 See fn 32 above. 
45 Which lasted almost four years, which has been interpreted by some commentators as 
stalling tactics in view of the possible reticence of some judges to avoid dealing with a 
politically sensitive issue. (Mayer 2000, 686). 
46 In a letter dated March 26, 1997. 
47 As provided by article 30 of  Regulation 404/93. 
48 See para 49 of the decision. 
49 See paras 50 and 51 of the decision. 
50 See para 67 of the decision. 
51 The FCC was thereby reaffirmed its Solange II decision. See BVerfGE 73, 378-381. 
52 That is to say, regulations, directives and decisions. 
53 See article 189 of the EC Treaty. 
54 Or “Solange dies so ist, wird das BVerfG seine Gerichtsbarkeit űber die Anwendbarkeit 
von abgeleitetem Gemeinschaftsrecht nicht mehr ausűben. Vorlagen von Normen des 
sekondären Gemeinschaftsrechts an das BVerfG sind deshalb unzulässig.” Here the court 
cross referred to its Solange II decision. See BVerfGE 73, 339. 
55 See para 60 of the decision. 
56 As amended on 21 December 1992. Article 23 (1) of the Basic Law provides that, “(1) To 
realize a unified Europe, Germany participates in the development of the European Union 
which is bound to democratic, rule of law, social, and federal principles as well as the 
principle of subsidiarity and provides a protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent 
to that of this Constitution. The federation can, for this purpose and with the consent of the 
Senate, delegate sovereign powers. Article 79 (2) & (3) is applicable for the foundation of the 
European Union as well as for changes in its contractual bases and comparable regulations by 
which the content of this Constitution is changed or amended or by which such changes or 
amendments are authorized.” 
57 Article 79 (III) of the Basic Law. 
58 Article 1 of the Basic Law. 
59 See Article 20 of the Basic Law. 
60 In the event of conflict, the competing constitutional principles must be balanced in 
accordance with the principle of maximum effectiveness or ‘practical concordance’. (Hesse, 
1995, 28 and 72). For a succinct yet informative outline of the applicability of article 23 of the 
Basic Law, see Schmidt (1999, 418, 419).  
61 See para 62 of the decision.  
62 Such as the right to property, the right to economic activity, the freedom of association, the 
right to equality and the prohibition against arbitrary conduct, the freedom of faith, the 
protection of the family and the principle of proportionality. See para 58 of the decision. 
63 See para 64 of the decision. 
64 In the sense that he was the reporting judge. 
65 That is to say both within and outwith Germany. 
66 Or Freund or Feind, to draw from the writings of Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 1928, 226) with 
which Kirchhof is particularly well acquainted.  
RSC 2001/31 © 2001 Miriam Aziz  33 
 
67 Indeed, his commentary on state theory and practice See Isensee/Kirchof, Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts I. Grundlagen von Staat und Verfassung  (1995) is one of the leading, if not the 
authority on German Public Law. 
68 Rulings with which the EU has, as yet, failed to comply. See ‘US warns of sanctions over 
EU’s banana import plans’ Financial Times February 23, 2001 at p. 1. 
69 Which it first referred to in its Maastricht decision. 
70 Which provides that, “Where a court considers that a statute on whose validity the court's 
decision depends is unconstitutional, the proceedings have to be stayed, and a decision has to 
be obtained from the State court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes where the 
constitution of a State is held to be violated, or from the Federal Constitutional Court where 
this Constitution is held to be violated. This also applies where this Constitution is held to be 
violated by State law or where a State statute is held to be incompatible with a federal 
statute.” 
71 See para 30 of the judgement. 
72 Indeed, the competence to set aside a law which is held not to conform with the Basic Law 
– in itself a form of ‘checks and balances’ - is regarded as being part and parcel of the 
Rechtsstaat principle. See von Műnch  / Kunig, Article 100 (1) at Rdnrs 2 and 3. 
73 See para 30 of the decision. 
74 See para 31 of the judgement. 
75 A position which is supported by legal academic opinion. See, for example, von Műnch / 
Kunig, Article 100 (1) at Rdnr 13. 
76 BVerfGE 89, 155 (175). 
77 See BVerfGE 89, 155 at 175. 
78 See generally Mayer (2000). 
79 See above. 
80 Thus, in the Maastricht decision the court refers to a co-operation relationship to (or “zum”) 
the ECJ which it amends to with (or ‘mit’) the ECJ. (Mayer 2001, 687). 
81 Formerly article 177 EC Treaty.  
82 See para 31 of the decision and also para 60, line 13 where the court states that, “Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht werde erst und nur dann im Rahmen seiner Gerichtsbarkeit wieder 
tätig, wenn der Europäische Gerichtshof den Grundrechtsstandard verlassen sollte, den der 
Senat in BVerfGE 73, 339 (378 bis 381) festgestellt hat.” 
83 See below. 
84 Constitutional courts in other member states have also adjudicated on the issue concerning 
the most appropriate level of human rights protection such as the decisions of the Italian 
Corte Costitutzionale the Spanish Tribunal Constitutional and the Danish Højesteret 
illustrate.
 See the decision of 1989, 232/89 Foro italiano 1990, 1855 and Zerini from 1994 
(117/94 Raccolta Ufficiale 1994, 785. See also Decision of 28/1991 from 14.2.1991 – 
European Parliament Elections, Boletín Oficial del Estado from 15.3.1991 as well as 
Declaration 108/1992 – Maastricht, EuGRZ 1993, 285 (in German translation). Further: 
Decision from 6.4.1998, Carlsen et al./Rasmussen, EuGRZ 1999, 49 (German translation). 
85 Or, applied, as the Maastricht judgment provides, the FCC reserves the right to argue that 
the ECJ has exceeded its competence. 
86 See below. 
87 See below. 
88 See generally Alston (1999). 
89 C 4/73 Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
90 BVerfGE 73, 339 at 389.  
91 OJ 2000, C 364/1. 
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92 This is also odd as one of the judges who was seized of the matter, Di Fabio had only 
relatively recently published an article on the Charter. (Di Fabio 1999, 737). 
93 That is to say, people who are related by birth and origin. 
94 Indeed, Kirchhof  uses the term as a heading for a section which begins with the following: 
“Die Staatlichkeit Deutschlands steht im Rahmen der europäische Einigung nicht zur 
Disposition”. See Kirchhof 1993, 95). 
95 This is not uncommon practice in German discussions concerning integration as a whole. A 
central element of a debate concerning Germany’s  ‘leading culture’ or Leitkultur which 
occurred in the autumn of 2000, was the way in which the elements which were reputed to 
make up this culture were used as criteria for exclusion. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
from October 30, 2000 at p.1. 
96 See ‘Wer ist die letzte Instanz?’ in Capital Ost on 01.05.1998 at p. 176. Indeed, the Banana 
case was even at one stage perceived as a threat to the EURO as an article in the Spiegel 
illustrates. See the edition of 04.11.1996 at p. 22. I would like to thank Matthias Geis from 
Die Zeit for providing me with a survey of the response to the project of European integration 
in the German press from the Maastricht Trial to the present day.  
97 See article 18 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (the Federal Constitutional Court 
Law).  
98 Indeed, this is an issue which has been raised before in connection with Kirchhof. See Aziz 
(2000, 227). 
99 See Focus from 13.2.1999 at p. 11. 
100 R. Zuck, ‘Der unkontrollierte Kontrolleur’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung August 24, 
1999 at p. 3. 
101 “Democracy does not insist on judges having the last word, but it does not insist that they 
must not have it.” (Dworkin 1996, 7). 
102 Such as Gűnter Hirsch and Manfred Zuleeg. 
103 Ingolf Pernice. 
104 Roland Bieber. 
105 Such as Paul Kirchhof and Dieter Grimm. 
106 Or alternatively speaking, the preference of deduction over induction. 
107 Berlin has written in relation to schools of philosophical thought that, “All these schools of 
thought, differing and indeed sharply opposed as they may be on many other crucial issues of 
principle, have at least one thing in common: they clearly favour one type of proposition or 
statement before all others; they treat it as possessing a virtue which other types 
conspicuously lack”. (Berlin 1980, 57).  
108 Whether it is by allusion to what social scientists sometimes refer to as the ‘Other’ or 
otherwise.  
109 Referred to as the respective bases of  “Geltung”and “Anwendung” regarding European 
Community Law. 
110 As the opening words of his leading commentary on German Public Law illustrate: “Dem 
folgt die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre. Sie deutet das Wort der Verfassung, auf das der Bestand 
des Staates gegründet ist.” See Isensee/Kirchof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts I. Grundlagen von 
Staat und Verfassung, § 19, Rdnr 7-11, 
111 See Kelsen ’s review (1915) of Eugen Ehrlich’s book Grundlegung der Soziologie des 
Rechts ([1913] Thus, for Kelsen, law was intrinsically linked to the state. For his opponent, 
Eugen Ehrlich, however, law or what he termed the ‘living law’ could exist without a state, an 
issue which has been developed further by systems theorists. See, for example, Teubner 
(1997).  
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112One is reminded of the social anthropologist Mary Douglas who describes a professional 
collective as one which ‘leads perception and trains it and produces a stock of knowledge’.  
This includes drawing up and maintaining criteria as regards what constitutes a reasonable 
question and a true or false answer.  In short, it provides the context and sets the limits for any 
evaluative judgment about what is objective.  See Douglas (1987, 12). 
113 The role of the state is, however, not obsolete as the rules regarding standing provide: 
States and not individuals have standing as parties to the proceedings. Individuals are still 
dependent on institutions of the state for the implementation and safeguard of their rights.  
114 It was at this time, namely during the 11th century, that Irnerius, a teacher of rhetoric who 
neglected his studies in grammar in favour of teaching Roman law, managed to obtain a copy 
of a transcribed version of Justinian's Digest (transcribed in the so-called writing F) which had 
been copied directly from the digest in the 6th century. The digest had disappeared from 
Italian legal practice only to reemerge in Constantinople in the Byzantine empire, where it 
prevailed over the legal system until the fall of the empire in the 15th century. Prior to the re-
discovery of the digest, its principles had only existed as (vulgarrecht) in Italy and other areas 
of the former Western Roman Empire. After the 11th century, however, the digest was the 
foundation of legal education at Bologna and other Italian universities. See Wesel (1997, 311-
312). 
115 Albeit universals which are predominantly in the Western tradition. 
116 Indeed, in 1200, one thousand law students were registered at the University of Bologna, 
half of which were not of Italian nationality. Many of these scholars came from Germany. See 
Wesel (1997, 312 and 360).  
117 It is arguable that the laws were not as neutral as they appeared to be as the legal reasoning 
inherent to Roman law was underpinned by economic objectives, namely, the safeguard of the 
production of goods which was at the apex of civilised society (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft).  
See F. Engels’ letter to Karl Kautsky and Max Weber Economy and Society (1925) cited in 
Wesel (1984, 68-69). 
118 Thus, according to the ius territoriale principle, no state could interfere in the affairs of 
another state. 
119 Such as Family law, for example. 
120 Such as constitutional and administrative law and human rights. 
121 Taking into account the fact that this may be a similar starting point and that different 
national values may continue to influence their interpretation. 
122This is the general notion espoused by two sociologists, Ramirez and Boli who write about 
mass education (they do not confine their findings to any particular branch of education) as 
the primary source of formal socialisation if the individual.  
123 See above. 
124 See Joschka Fischer’s speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000 and 
Jacques Chirac’s speech before the German Bundestag on 27 June 2000 in which both argue 
in favour of the drawing up of a European Constitution. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
of both the 15 of May 2000 and of the 28 June, 2000. The speech is reproduced at 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r000512b. See also Joerges, Mény and Weiler 
(2000).  
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